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Abstract 
We investigate the association between voluntary disclosure and the risk-related discount 
investors apply to price. Prior research indicates that when the analysis is based on a 
commitment to disclose the association is negative (i.e., more disclosure is associated 
with a lower discount). Our results suggest that with voluntary, or endogenous, disclosure 
the association is not necessarily negative, and in most cases the association is positive. 
This implies that in studies of either the discount or cost of capital, some care should be 
taken to distinguish endogenous disclosure choice (i.e., voluntary disclosure) from 
disclosure commitment. 
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to o¤er results about the association between voluntary disclo-
sure and the discount that investors apply to a rms expected cash ow when they price the
rm. In a setting where a rms expected cash ow is xed, the discount that investors apply
to price is equivalent to a rms cost of capital as the latter is commonly dened (e.g., Lam-
bert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2007). Existing theory posits that an increased commitment
to disclose information about a rms future prospects or terminal cash ow, irrespective
of the nature of the information disclosed subsequent to the commitment, results in a re-
duction in the rms cost of capital.1 In contrast, we investigate the association between
voluntary disclosure choice and the discount investors apply to price (or cost of capital). To
our knowledge, there is no theory-based literature that addresses this question.
By voluntary disclosure, we mean a policy to disclose information that depends both on
features of the economy and the ex post realization of the information prior to its disclosure.
Because it depends on the ex post realization of information, voluntary disclosure is an exam-
ple of endogenous disclosure choice and its analysis is more nuanced than an analysis based
on a commitment to disclose. The latter examines how a ceteris paribus change in the preci-
sion or level of disclosure as an exogenous parameter a¤ects the discount as an endogenous
variable. The former examines how a ceteris paribus change in an exogenous feature of the
economy a¤ects simultaneously the level of voluntary disclosure and the discount as endoge-
nous variables, and then determines the association between disclosure and the discount. As
we discuss below, the association between voluntary disclosure and the discount that results
is not necessarily negative (i.e., more voluntary disclosure is not necessarily associated with
1 See, for example, Corollary 3 in Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Corollary 1 in Baiman and Verrecchia
(1996), Proposition 3 of Easley and OHara (2004), Proposition 2 in Lambert, et al. (2007), Theorem 1 in
Christensen, de la Rosa and Feltham (2010), Proposition 1 in Gao (2010), and Proposition 5 in Bloomeld and
Fischer (2011). Note that these papers typically do not couch their results in the context of a commitment
to disclose, but instead show that an increase in disclosure precision, or a reduction in the variance of
measurement error, results in lower cost of capital. For all intents and purposes, an increase in disclosure
precision and/or a reduction in the variance of measurement error are tantamount to an increase in the
commitment to disclose.
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a lower discount) and in most cases the association is positive. This implies that in studies
of either the discount or cost of capital, some care should be taken to distinguish voluntary
disclosure from a disclosure commitment.
Casual inspection of the extant literature on disclosure and cost of capital suggests that
researchers have tended to blur the distinction between these two concepts. For example,
in an early and very inuential paper, Botosan (1997, p.326) hypothesizes and tests for a
negative association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital based,
in part, on an appeal to the disclosure commitment models of Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). More recently, Hail (2011) in his discussion of Serafeim
(2011) similarly suggests that, as is the case with a commitment, voluntary disclosure might
reasonably be expected to yield a negative, though weaker, association between disclosure
and cost of capital. Consistent with the thesis of a negative association, Beyer, Cohen,
Lys, and Walther (2010, p.308) remarks that Much of the empirical literature to date in
this second category [cross-sectional association between voluntary disclosures and the cost of
capital] seeks to provide evidence that rms that disclose more have a lower cost of capital.2
Our analysis suggests that when disclosure is voluntary/endogenous, the opposite e¤ect is
more likely to be observed.
We study the association between voluntary disclosure and the discount that investors
apply to a rms expected cash ow by extending the voluntary disclosure setting of Jung
and Kwon (1988; JK) to an economy where investors are risk averse. We choose JK because
while the setting itself is parsimonious, nonetheless it o¤ers a well established framework for
examining the role of voluntary disclosure.3 Because JK is based on the assumption that
investors are risk neutral, in pricing a rms shares investors apply no discount to the rms
expected cash ow on average (we show this in our analysis below). Our assumption that
2 See, for example, Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Easley, Hvidkjaer and OHara (2002),
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Cohen (2008), and Serafeim (2011) amongst others. See Leuz and Wysocki
(2008), Beyer, et al. (2010), and Berger (2011) for recent comprehensive reviews of the disclosure research.
3 For example, using this setting: Dye and Sridhar (1995) study herding behavior in disclosures; Pae
(2002) examines the allocation of resources; Shin (2003) predicts return variance; and Shin (2006) considers
future disclosure risks.
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investors are risk averse extends JKs setting to an economy where investors discount the
rms expected cash ow because the cash ow is uncertain. In our analysis, we focus on
the expected, or average, discount in price across possible disclosure outcomes. However,
we also discuss the nature of the discount in price conditional on whether or not the rm
discloses.
Our setting incorporates four broad features that characterize an economy: 1) the level
of investorsrisk aversion; 2) the probability that the rm is uninformed; 3) the number of
investors in the economy, and 4) the distribution of the rms cash ow. We interpret a
decrease or deterioration in each of these features as an exacerbation in the adverse selection
environment between the rm and investors. For example, more risk aversion on the part
of investors serves to exacerbate the adverse selection environment. In our main analysis
we investigate the impact of changes in each of these four features on the rms voluntary
disclosure decision and on the resulting discount in price. In a majority of circumstances
that involve a ceteris paribus change in one of the four features, we show that an exacer-
bation of adverse selection results in more disclosure in conjunction with a higher discount.
The economic intuition that explains this is straightforward. In standard voluntary dis-
closure settings, a rm chooses to disclose private information by taking into account the
penalty investors apply to price in the absence of disclosure as protection from the adverse
selection environment they face (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). When features of the economy
change that exacerbate adverse selection, there are two e¤ects. In valuing the rm investors
apply a higher price penalty to the rms unconditional expected cash ow as a result of
heightened adverse selection, motivating the rm to increase disclosure to counteract the
higher penalty. This increased disclosure works to decrease the discount in price. But the
changed economic features also generally are associated with a deterioration in the general
risk environment facing investors, for example through increased uncertainty or increased
risk aversion. This deterioration works to increase the discount in price. The problem here
is that the second-order e¤ect of more disclosure generally does not overcome the rst-order
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e¤ect of deterioration in the risk environment, and hence the discount increases.4
It is important to emphasize that our model is compatible with the prior literature that
establishes a negative relation between an improvement in the commitment to disclosure and
the cost of capital. In particular, two features of our model align closely with that literature.
First, we show in the context of our model that an increase in disclosure precision that
decreases investorsuncertainty prior to the rms voluntary disclosure decision is associated
negatively with the discount in price. Second, holding all exogenous parameters constant in
our model, the (conditional) discount manifest in price is lower when a rm discloses versus
withholds its information. Despite these similarities, we show that in a voluntary disclosure
setting if exogenous parameters change in a manner that results in an increased likelihood of
disclosure by the rm, in general the discount also increases: greater disclosure is associated
with a higher discount. The reason for this is that the exogenous factors that cause an
increase in the likelihood of disclosure also cause an increase in the discount experienced by
the rm if it does not disclose. And as we show below, the second e¤ect is, in the majority
of circumstances, dominant.
Perhaps the chief empirical implication of our paper is that the contemporaneous relation
between a change in the level of disclosure and the discount in price as a result of a change
in the risk environment is positive. However, to the extent to which increased disclosure is
subsequently perceived as a commitment, then the relation between a change in the level of
disclosure and the discount will be negative. A variety of empirical results already exist in
the literature that accord with this implication. For example, Leuz and Schrand (2009; LS)
reports evidence that the increased perceived (exogenous) uncertainty for U.S. rms that
accompanied the Enron shock resulted in both an increased estimated cost of capital and in-
creased voluntary disclosure by rms in order to mitigate transparency concerns. Moreover,
4 Larcker and Rusticus (2010, pp.198-199) anticipates this possibility: ...rms with high risk and uncer-
tainty in their business environment (and thus a high cost of capital) may try to increase their disclosure
quality in order to reduce cost of capital. To the extent that they are only partially successful, this causes a
positive relation between disclosure quality and cost of capital.One could interpret our analysis as test-
ing this intuition in the context of a model of voluntary disclosure, and conrming it in the majority of
circumstances (i.e., relating to variation in most of the exogneous model factors).
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the association between changed cost of capital and disclosure is positive across the sample
of rms in LS, despite additional evidence that the increased disclosure was successful in mit-
igating some of the increased perceived uncertainty. Similarly, Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly,
and Ljungqvist (2011) reports evidence of a contemporaneous relation between increased
voluntary disclosure and greater illiquidity in a setting wherein exogenous terminations of
analyst coverages increases adverse selection.5 However, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) also nds
that the liquidity for the rms that increased disclosure increased in subsequent periods. In
a similar vein, LS nds a subsequent reduction in cost of capital following increased disclo-
sure due to the Enron crises. These ndings are consistent with subsequent, and persistent,
disclosure being perceived as a commitment that results in greater liquidity (Balakrishnan
et al., 2011) and a decline in cost of capital (LS).
Although voluntary disclosure and the discount are associated positively in a majority
of circumstances, there are circumstances where the association is negative. For example,
consider the e¤ect of a ceteris paribus change in the probability that the rm is uninformed.
Below we represent this probability as p. Here, in the context of JK and our extension of
their model, a rms failure to report voluntarily could either be the result of the rms
unwillingness to provide bad newsor the fact that the rm is genuinely uninformed. As
we prove below, an increase in p increases the threshold beyond which the rm discloses
voluntarily. Thus an increase in p decreases the likelihood of disclosure in two ways: directly
through the increase in p itself, and indirectly through the increased threshold. The result
is a greater decrease in disclosure compared with changes in other model parameters where
only the second, indirect e¤ect is present. At the same time, an increase in p has a smaller
e¤ect on the discount in price conditional on non-disclosure because it does not a¤ect the
ex ante distribution of the rms cash ow or investorsrisk preferences. We show below
that the combination of these e¤ects implies that there is no monotonic relation between
5 A related nding is reported by Skinner (1997) and Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) in the disclosure/legal
cost setting. The observed association between disclosure and legal costs is positive (against most expecta-
tions), but negative once one controls for endogeneity (i.e., the fact that other underlying factors cause both
to increase concurrently).
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p and the discount. That said, we provide examples where the countervailing e¤ect that
dominates depends on the number of investors who compete for the rms shares. Specically,
we show that when the number of investors is low the discount investors apply to price
monotonically increases with p, whereas when the number is high the discount rst increases
and then decreases with p.6 In both circumstances, disclosure and the discount are associated
negatively for low values of p: in other words, when the likelihood of disclosure is high. Thus
our examples suggest that the generally expected negative association between (voluntary)
disclosure and cost of capital might be most likely to be observed when disclosure levels are
already high, but not when they are low.
More generally, as we discuss further below, our results suggest that in voluntary disclo-
sure settings such as ours the association between disclosure and the discount in price will
di¤er depending on the nature of the exogenous factors that underlie variation in disclosure
and the discount. For factors directly related to the riskiness of the rms cash ow and/or
the appetite for risk of investors, our analysis suggests the association will be positive, con-
trary to typically expressed expectations. For other factors, however, the association can be
positive and/or negative, but will be negative when exogenous factors are such that disclo-
sure levels and the likelihood of disclosure are high. These insights could prove useful in the
design of empirical experiments about the relation between voluntary disclosure and cost of
capital.
Finally, one caveat to applying the results of our analysis on the positive association
between voluntary disclosure and the discount in price to empirical studies on cost of capital
is that the discount is equivalent to cost of capital in a circumstance where a rms expected
cash ow is xed. However, to the extent to which a rms expected cash ow is not xed
because, for example, investment decisions are endogenous, then the discount that investors
apply to expected cash ow is only one factor in cost of capital (albeit an important factor).
6 These examples comport with other recent evidence that the number of investors who compete for a
rms shares may be an important conditioning variable in assessing cost of capital. See Akins, Ng, and
Verdi (2011); Armstrong, Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia (2011); and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012).
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Thus, studies that posit a negative association between voluntary disclosure and cost of
capital could still be correct to the extent to which the focus is on some phenomenon other
than the discount.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our adap-
tation of JKs model that allows for risk aversion on the part of investors, and show that, as
in JK, our adaptation implies the existence of a unique threshold level of disclosure above
which the rm discloses information and below which it withholds information. In Section
3 we provide a variety of comparative static results on measures of increased disclosure, as
manifest in the threshold level of disclosure and the likelihood that the rm discloses, and the
extent to which investors discount the rms expected cash ow. We summarize our results
in Section 4.
2 A model of voluntary disclosure
To start, we consider a rm whose cash ow is uncertain in period 1, but becomes realized
in period 2. Let ~V represent the rms (uncertain) cash ow in period 1, and let ~V = V
represent the realization of the rms cash ow in period 2. We summarize the notation used
in the paper in Table 1. [Insert Table 1 here.] In period 1, before the rms cash ow is
realized, the rm sells shares to investors who bid to hold claims in the rms realized cash
ow in period 2.
Also in period 1, we assume that the rm may learn in advance its realized cash ow (i.e.,
~V = V ): with probability p the rm has no knowledge of its cash ow until it is realized in
period 2, and with probability 1  p the rm learns its cash ow in period 1.7 In period 1 if
the rm learns ~V = V , then following JK we assume that the rm decides to either disclose
or withhold this information based on which action maximizes the value of the rm in period
7 While we assume that the item over which the rm may be uninformed is the rms realized cash ow
in period 2, it should be clear that p could represent the probability that the rm is uninformed about any
one of a variety of economic phenomena that could be of interest to investors, such as fair value measures of
assets and liabilities, future investment decisions, pending litigation, etc.
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1.8 Let P (V ) represent the price of the rm conditional on the rms decision to disclose
publicly ~V = V , and P (ND) the price of the rm conditional on no disclosure (where we
use ND to represent no disclosure). Conditional on the rm disclosing ~V = V in period 1,
we show below that competition among investors to buy shares in the rm results in P (V )
being equal to an amount that leaves investors indi¤erent between holding shares in the rm
versus purchasing no stake in the rm. Similarly, conditional on no disclosure, competition
among investors to buy shares in the rm results in P (ND) being equal to an amount that
leaves investors indi¤erent between holding shares in the rm versus purchasing no stake
in the rm. In period 2 the rms cash ow is realized, the rm liquidates, and ~V = V is
distributed to shareholders based on the claims to the rm that they established in period
1.
As for the distribution of the rms cash ow, as in JK we assume that cash ow real-
izations ~V = V are distributed over the range [L;H], where Land Hare mnemonics
for lowand high,respectively. We make no assumptions about L and H other than the
fact that they are real-valued numbers with the feature that L  H. Let F (V ) represent
the cumulative probability distribution of ~V , and f (V ) the density function of ~V . Because
~V 2 [L;H],
F (V ) = 0 for all V  L and F (V ) = 1 for all V  H:
Finally, let  represent the rms expected (or mean) cash ow: that is,  = E
h
~V
i
=R H
L
V dF (V ).
The focus of our study is on the expected price or value of the rm in period 1 based on
all possible events that may transpire in period 1. Let P represent the rms expected price
or value based on all possible events, let  represent the probability that the rm discloses
in period 1 (which implies that 1    represents the probability that it does not disclose),
and let t represent the threshold above which the rm discloses if it knows ~V = V in period
8 For example, as JK states on p. 148: ...we assume that the rms shareholders unanimously agree to
a disclosure policy which maximizes rm value...
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1 (where below we establish the existence of such a t). We compute P as
P = E
h
P

~V

jDisclosure of ~V = V  t
i
 + P (ND) (1  ) :
Here we study the extent to which the price or value of the rm reects a discount to the
rms expected cash ow, which is . For example, let  represent the extent to which price
discounts the rms expected cash ow. We dene and measure  as
    P:
The chief motivation for our paper is to understand whether measures of increased disclosure,
as manifest in the threshold above which the rm discloses (t) and the likelihood that the
rm discloses (), are associated positively or negatively with the extent to which investors
discount the rms expected cash ow, as measured by .
With regard to investorsutility for wealth, we assume that investors are risk averse. Let
U (w) represent investorsutility for wealth w. We represent risk aversion through a simple,
piecewise-linear function: specically, U (w) = w for w  , and U (w) =  + (w   ) for
w >  where 0   and 0    1. We refer to  as the switching pointin investorsutility
function for wealth, and to  as the slope in investorsutility function for wealth when an
investors wealth exceeds . We assume 0   to ensure that investors associate a utility of 0
to wealth of 0 (i.e., U (0) = 0); allowing for the possibility that  < 0 does not qualitatively
a¤ect the results of our analysis. Using Jensens Inequality, it is a straightforward exercise to
show that U (w) is a concave function and thus manifests risk aversion (we leave the proof to
the interested reader). There are two advantages to representing utility as a piecewise-linear
function. First, it facilitates the derivation of the P , P (V ), and P (ND). Second, the utility
function reverts seamlessly to risk neutrality by either setting  = 1 or allowing  ! 1,
and this makes comparisons between our results and those of JK very transparent.9
9 Many of our results hold with more general utility functions. For example, uniqueness of the equilibrium
9
Finally, we assume that investors have no endowed wealth, but can borrow funds at no
cost. An implication of the assumption that investors have no endowed wealth, along with
the fact that 0  , is that an investor associates a utility of U (0) = 0 to purchasing no
stake in the rm and holding no claim to the rms cash ow in period 1.
Recall that  represents the extent to which investors discount the rms expected cash
ow. When investors are risk neutral (which results from either setting  = 1 or allowing
 ! 1), we show below that there is no discount. In other words, when investors are
risk neutral it is always the case that P =  (and thus there is no discount) irrespective of
whether the rm commits to: 1) a policy of full disclosure ex ante; 2) a policy of no disclosure
ex ante; or 3) behaves strategically in period 1 if it learns ~V = V . This result comports
with the analysis in JK, which assumes that investors are risk neutral. Thus, an ancillary
benet of our analysis is that it extends the analysis in JK to a setting where investors are
risk averse and a discount arises.
Note that the economy we describe has four categories of exogenous features: 1) investors
risk aversion as manifest in the switching point in investorsutility function for wealth, ,
and the slope in investorsutility function for wealth, ; 2) the probability that the rm has
no knowledge of the rms realized cash ow in period 1, p; 3) the number of investors in the
economy (which we represent below by N); and 4) the distribution of the rms cash ow,
F (V ). The goal of our analysis is to understand how a change in an exogenous feature of the
economy a¤ects simultaneously measures of increased disclosure, as manifest in the threshold
level of disclosure (t) and the likelihood of disclosure (), and the discount investors apply
to the rms expected cash ow (). When an exogenous change results simultaneously in
increased disclosure and a lower (higher) discount, we say that disclosure and the discount are
associated negatively (positively) through the exogenous change. Of course, an exogenous
disclosure threshold, and the fact that the threshold increases in the probability rms do not have private
information, holds for all increasing, concave utility functions. Also, with general utility functions shifting
the distribution of ~V to the right and/or shrinking the distribution towards its mean yield the same e¤ects
as our results relating to rst- and second-order stochastic dominance changes to F (). Also, our results
hold if we assume that investors have constant absolute risk aversion (i.e., CARA utility) and F () has a
normal distribution. Details to these claims are available from the authors.
10
change may result in no monotonic association in general. In this circumstance we say that
increased disclosure and the discount are unrelated through the exogenous change.
2.1 Price formation in period 1
We assume that in period 1 investors bid for shares in the rms cash ow by playing a Nash
game that eliminates any surplus to investors. Here we describe the market mechanism in
period 1 that determines the price or value of the rm conditional on the rms decision to
disclose publicly ~V = V , P (V ), versus the price of the rm conditional on no disclosure,
P (ND). The role of the market mechanism is to make formal a valuation process that is
very intuitive. Namely, if in period 1 the rm reveals that the value of the rm is ~V = V ,
then the market assesses the price (value) of the rm to be P (V ) = V . Similarly, if in
period 1 the rm reveals nothing, then the market assesses the price (value) of the rm to
be P (ND), where P (ND) equals the expected value of ~V conditional on no disclosure less
a discount for the uncertainty investors associate with not knowing the exact realization of
~V = V .
To describe the market mechanism, we begin by assuming that N investors compete to
hold shares of the rm in period 1. In addition, we assume that investorsdemand orders are
handled by a non-strategic market maker who chooses which investors will hold shares. The
market makers rule is to ask each of theN investors for a quote to purchase a fraction 1=N th
of the rm.10 Let q (V ) represent an investors quote conditional on the rm revealing that
the rm has cash ow of ~V = V , and let q (ND) represent an investors quote conditional
on no disclosure. The market maker allocates an equal number of shares to each investor if
each investor quotes the same price. If M  N investors are tied for the highest price for
holding 1=N th of the rm, each investor who quotes the highest price receives a fraction
1=M th of the rm and this is a binding commitment.
Given this commitment, a symmetric Nash equilibrium is for each investor to quote the
10 This market mechanism is adapted from Diamond and Verrecchia (1991).
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same price. The price is determined such that a deviation to a higher price for holding a
fraction 1=N th of the rm would lead to: 1) an investor holding a larger fraction because the
fraction one holds in the rm is an increasing function of price; and 2) an investor associating
a negative utility to holding the larger fraction. Alternatively, a deviation to a lower price
would result in an investor having no stake in the rm, and associating a utility of U (0) = 0
to this outcome.
Now consider the derivation of P (V ), the price of the rm conditional on the decision to
disclose publicly ~V = V . The expected utility an investor associates with holding a fraction
1=N th of the rm at a quote of q (V ) is
E
"
U
 
~V
N
  q

~V
!
j ~V = V
#
= U

V
N
  q (V )

=
8><>: + 
 
V
N
  q (V )   if V
N
  q (V ) > 
V
N
  q (V ) if V
N
  q (V )  
:
This implies that if an investor quotes a price higher than V
N
then he will associate a negative
utility for any fraction of the rm he holds, and if he quotes a price lower than V
N
then he
will end up with no stake in the rm because other investors will quote a price V
N
. Thus,
each investor quotes q (V ) = V
N
and ends up holding a fraction 1=N th of the rm. In other
words, when the rm reveals in period 1 that the rms realized cash ow is ~V = V , an
investor is indi¤erent between purchasing a fraction 1=N th of the rm at a price quote of
q (V ) = V
N
versus having no stake in the rm, because in either case an investors utility is
U (0) = 0. Finally, when each of N investors quotes a price q (V ) = V
N
, then the market as
a whole values the rm at P (V ) = N  q (V ) = V:
Now we consider P (ND), the price of the rm conditional on no disclosure. Because
P (V ) is increasing in V when the rm discloses ~V = V and the rm behaves strategically
to maximize rm value, a disclosure/withholding region must consist of a threshold t above
which the rm discloses and below which it does not. If the rm elects not to disclose (denoted
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by ND), this implies that either the rm did not observe ~V or observed ~V = V  t. Thus,
the expected utility an investor associates with holding a fraction 1=N th of the rm at a
quote of q (ND) is
E
"
U
 
~V
N
  q (ND)
!
jND
#
=
p
p+ (1  p)F (t)E
"
U
 
~V
N
  q (ND)
!#
+
(1  p)F (t)
p+ (1  p)F (t)E
"
U
 
~V
N
  q (ND)
!
j ~V = V  t
#
=
p
p+ (1  p)F (t)
"Z N+Nq(ND)
L

V
N
  q (ND)

dF (V )
+
Z H
N+Nq(ND)

+ (
V
N
  q (ND)  )

dF (V )

+
(1  p)F (t)
p+ (1  p)F (t)
"
1
F (t)
Z N+Nq(ND)
L

V
N
  q (ND)

dF (V )
+
1
F (t)
Z t
N+Nq(ND)

+ 

V
N
  q (ND)  

dF (V )

: (1)
Because the rm behaves strategically to maximize rm value, it must be the case that the
price (value) of the rm in the absence of disclosure, P (ND), equals the threshold value
above which the rm discloses and below which it withholds: that is, P (ND) = t. But if
P (ND) = t and P (ND) = N  q (ND), then it must be the case that q (ND) = t
N
in
equilibrium, and thus t  N + Nq (ND) = N + t because 0  . But this implies that
the interval [N+Nq (ND) ; t] is null, and thus, eqn. (1) reduces to
E
"
U
 
~V
N
  q (ND)
!
jND
#
=
p
p+ (1  p)F (t)
"Z N+Nq(ND)
L

V
N
  q (ND)

dF (V )
+
Z H
N+Nq(ND)

+ (
V
N
  q (ND)  )

dF (V )

+
(1  p)F (t)
p+ (1  p)F (t)

1
F (t)
Z t
L

V
N
  q (ND)

dF (V )

=
1
N
E[ ~V jND]  q (ND)  p
1   (1  )

Z H
N+Nq(ND)
(
V
N
    q (ND))dF (V ) ; (2)
13
where  = (1  p) (1  F (t)) is the probability of disclosure, 1  = p+ (1  p)F (t) is the
probability of no disclosure, and E[ ~V jND] = 1
1 

p+ (1  p) R t
L
V dF (V )

is the expected
value of ~V given the absence of disclosure.
Consider the value for q (ND) that reduces the right-hand-side of eqn. (2) to 0; that is,
q (ND) =
1
N
E[ ~V jND]  p
1   (1  )
Z H
N+Nq(ND)
(
V
N
    q (ND))dF (V ) : (3)
If an investor quotes a price higher than q (ND) as determined in eqn. (3), then he will
associate a negative utility for any fraction of the rm he holds, and if he quotes a price
lower than q (ND) then he will end up with no stake in the rm because other investors will
quote q (ND). Thus, each investor quotes q (ND) as determined in eqn. (3) and ends up
holding a fraction 1=N th of the rm. Conditional on no disclosure, this leaves an investor
indi¤erent between purchasing a fraction 1=N th of the rm at a price quote of q (ND) as
determined in eqn. (3) versus having no stake in the rm, because in either case an investors
utility is U (0) = 0.
The only problem with eqn. (3) is that it determines q (ND) implicitly because q (ND)
appears on both sides of the equation. Thus, our next task is to show that there exists a
unique q (ND) that solves eqn. (3).
2.2 A unique threshold level of disclosure
Recall that q (ND) = t
N
in equilibrium. This allows us to re-express eqn. (3) as
t
N
=
1
N
E[ ~V jND]  p
1   (1  )
Z H
N+t
(
V
N
    t
N
)dF (V ) ;
or
t = E[ ~V jND]  p
1   (1  )
Z H
N+t
(V  N  t)dF (V ) : (4)
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An immediate implication of eqn. (4) is that t < E[ ~V jND] < . The rst inequality follows
because the integral in eqn. (4) is positive. The second inequality is true from the denition
of E[ ~V jND] = 1
1 

p+ (1  p) R t
L
V dF (V )

. Thus the disclosure threshold t (and price
of the rm in the absence of disclosure) is less than both the unconditional expected value
of the nal payo¤ (), and the conditional expected value in the event of non-disclosure
(E[ ~V jND]).
The solution to eqn. (4) is equivalent to the existence of a t that solves T (t) = 0, where
T (t) is dened as
T (t) = p

 (  t) + (1  )N+ (1  )
Z N+t
L
(V  N  t) dF (V )

+(1  p)
Z t
L
(V   t) dF (V ) : (5)
Eqn. (5) is obtained by multiplying eqn. (4) throughout by 1    and rearranging. Note
that T (t) can also be expressed as
T (t) = p

 (  t) + (1  )N  (1  )
Z N+t
L
F (V ) dV

  (1  p)
Z t
L
F (V ) dV: (6)
Both expressions will prove useful in our analysis below.11
To show the existence of a unique t that solves T (t) = 0, it is su¢ cient to show that
T (t = L) > 0, T (t = H) < 0, and T (t) is monotonically decreasing in t. We show this in
the next proposition. (All proofs are provided in the appendix.)
Proposition 1. There exists a unique t that solves T (t) = 0, and thus a unique threshold
above which the rm discloses ~V = V and below which it withholds this information.
Consider the following illustration of Proposition 1. Let N = 10,  = 0:1,  = 0:9, and
p = 0:5. In addition, assume that ~V has a uniform distribution between 0 and 20, which
11 Note also that when  = 1, which is equivalent to assuming that investors are risk neutral, the equilib-
rium condition T (t) = 0 using eqn. (6) is identical to the equilibrium condition in JK.
15
implies  = 10. Here, the threshold level of disclosure computes to t = 8:0724. Alternatively,
when investors are risk neutral then eqn. (6) reduces to
T (t) = p (  t)  (1  p)
Z t
L
F (V ) dV; (7)
and t rises to 8:2843. This implies that risk aversion on the part of investors leads to a rm
establishing a lower threshold level of disclosure, and thus a higher likelihood of disclosure,
because risk aversion exacerbates adverse selection. We explore this, and other comparative
static results, in the next section.
3 Comparative statics
Our next goal is to understand the relation between the exogenous features of the economy
we describe and the two measures of increased disclosure, the threshold level of disclosure, t,
and the probability of disclosure, . Our economy has four categories of exogenous features:
1) investorsrisk aversion as manifest in the switching point in investorsutility function for
wealth, , and the slope in investorsutility function for wealth, ; 2) the probability that
the rm has no knowledge of the rms realized cash ow in period 1, p; 3) the number of
investors in the economy, N ; and 4) the distribution of the rms cash ow, F (V ). Broadly
stated, the threshold level of disclosure typically rises (falls) and the probability of disclosure
typically falls (rises) in response to a change in an exogenous feature of the economy that
ameliorates (exacerbates) adverse selection between the rm and investors.
For example, a reduction in the likelihood that the rm is informed in period 1 (i.e., an
increase in p) ameliorates adverse selection and thus the rm raises the threshold level of
disclosure in response (i.e., t rises). Similarly, a decrease in investorsrisk aversion (i.e., an
increase in  and/or ) or an increase in the number of investors who share the risk of holding
shares in the rm in period 1 (i.e., an increase in N) ameliorates adverse selection, and here
as well the rm raises the threshold level of disclosure in response. Finally, an increase in
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more favorablecash ow outcomes in the distribution of F (V ) in the sense of 1st-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD) or 2nd-order stochastic dominance (SOSD) ameliorates adverse
selection and also results in the rm raising the threshold level of disclosure.12 We codify
these observations in the next result.
Proposition 2. The threshold level of disclosure, t, increases as either: 1) the switching
point in investorsutility function for wealth, , increases; 2) the slope in investorsutility
function for wealth, , increases; 3) the probability that the rm has no knowledge of the
rms realized cash ow, p, increases; 4) the number of investors who compete for rm
shares, N , increases; or 5) the distribution of the rms cash ow, F (V ), improves in the
sense of FOSD or SOSD.
We achieve similar results for the probability that the rm discloses, . Indeed, the only
di¤erence between Proposition 2 and our next result is that there is no monotonic relation
between the probability of disclosure and a change in the distribution of the rms cash ow
in the sense of FOSD and SOSD.
Proposition 3. The probability of disclosure, , decreases as either: 1) the switching
point in investorsutility function for wealth, , increases; 2) the slope in investorsutility
function for wealth, , increases; 3) the probability that the rm has no knowledge of the
rms realized cash ow, p, increases; or 4) the number of investors who compete for rm
shares, N , increases.
For example, consider the illustration that followed Proposition 1. In that illustration we
assumed N = 10,  = 0:1,  = 0:9, and p = 0:5, and also assumed that ~V has a uniform
distribution between 0 and 20 (which implies  = 10). There the threshold level of disclosure
computed to t = 8:0724. In addition, one can show that the probability of disclosure, ,
computes to 0:2982. When the probability that the rm is uninformed in period 1 increases
12 We refer the reader to Hanoch and Levy (1969) for a discussion of FOSD and SOSD.
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from p = 0:5 to p = 0:6, then consistent with Proposition 2 t rises to 8:5164, and consistent
with Proposition 3 the probability of disclosure falls to 0:2297.
To digress briey, the reason why there is no monotonic relation between the probability
of disclosure and a change in the distribution of the rms cash ow in the sense of FOSD and
SOSD is that  = (1  p) (1  F (t)). Here, consider an improvement in the distribution
of the rms cash ow in the sense of FOSD: let the cumulative probability distribution
G (V ) represent this improvement. FOSD implies that 1 G (V )  1 F (V ) for all V , and
this would seem to suggest that the probability of disclosure increases when the distribution
of cash ow improves to G (V ). The problem here, however, is that from Proposition 2
the threshold level of disclosure when cash ow has a distribution G (V ) is higher than the
threshold level of disclosure when cash ow has a distribution F (V ) because an improvement
in cash ow in the sense of FOSD ameliorates adverse selection. For example, if we represent
the former threshold level by tG and the latter by tF , then from Proposition 2 tG  tF .
This being the case, it is no longer clear that 1 G (tG) is greater than 1  F (tF ), because
1 G (V ) and 1  F (V ) are decreasing in V and tG  tF .
3.1 The discount in price
Our next task is to compute P and determine the discount investors apply to the rms
expected cash ow in period 1. Recall that P represents the rms expected price or value
in period 1, where we compute P as
P = E
h
P

~V

jDisclosure of ~V = V  t
i
 + P (ND) (1  ):
Proposition 4. The expected value or price of the rm in period 1 is
P =   p (  t) + (1  p)
Z t
L
(t  V ) dF (V ) : (8)
As an aside, note that the three parameters that measure the risk-bearing capacity of the
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market (i.e., , , andN), do not appear explicitly in the expression for P . These parameters
are implicit, however, in the calculation of t, and thus will manifest in our analysis below of
the discount.
The chief implication of Proposition 4 is that the discount that investors apply to the
rm relative to the rms expected cash ow, , is
 = p (  t) + (1  p)
Z t
L
(V   t) dF (V ) : (9)
Alternatively, using the equilibrium condition as expressed in eqn. (5),  can also be ex-
pressed as
 = p (1  )
Z H
N+t
(V  N  t) dF (V )

: (10)
These expressions can be employed to establish two facts about . First, it is clear from
eqn. (10) that   0 for all t. Second, although it might not seem immediately obvious
from eqn. (9),  = 0 if either  = 1 or !1. This follows from the fact that when  = 1
or !1, eqn. (5) reduces to
T (t) = p (  t) + (1  p)
Z t
L
(V   t) dF (V ) ;
and thus a t such that T (t) = 0 in eqn. (5) implies that  = 0 in eqn. (9). This proves our
earlier claim that investors apply no discount to the rms expected cash ow in JK, which
is based on investors being risk neutral.
Next we study the behavior of the discount. The following proposition indicates that
changes in the three features of the economy relating to the ability of the market to absorb
risk - the two risk aversion parameters  and , and the number of investors, N - have an
unambiguous association with the discount applied to the rms cash ow. Changes in these
parameters ameliorate the severity of the adverse selection problem between the rm and
investors, which results in a lower discount.
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Proposition 5. The discount investors apply to the rms cash ow, , decreases as either:
1) the switching point in investorsutility function for wealth, , increases; 2) the slope in
investorsutility function for wealth, , increases; or 3) the number of investors who compete
for rm shares, N , increases.
Unlike Proposition 2, Proposition 5 makes no reference to the e¤ect on  of a change in
the distribution of the rms cash ow, or the probability that the rm is uninformed, p.
We consider the rst of these issues next while we discuss the second issue in the following
subsection.
With regard to the e¤ect of a change in the distribution of the rms cash ow, F (V ),
in the sense of FOSD or SOSD, such a change potentially a¤ects both the rms mean cash
ow, , and the discount. So as to keep the focus of the analysis on the discount, we consider
instead the e¤ect of an improvement in the distribution of the rms cash ow in the sense
of SOSD on the discount, but in a circumstance where the mean cash ow stays xed (i.e., 
stays xed). An improvement of this nature is referred to as a mean-preserving contraction
(MPC).13 The following proposition establishes that a mean-preserving contraction in the
distribution, F (V ), results in an unambiguous decrease in the discount applied by investors.
Proposition 6. The discount investors apply to the rms cash ow, , (weakly) decreases
as the distribution in the rms cash ow improves in the sense of a mean-preserving contrac-
tion (MPC): that is, a circumstance where the distribution of the rms cash ow improves
in the sense of SOSD but the mean cash ow stays xed.
To illustrate Proposition 6, consider again the illustration that followed Proposition 1. In
that illustration we assumed N = 10,  = 0:1,  = 0:9, and p = 0:5, and also assumed
that ~V has a uniform distribution between 0 and 20 (which implies  = 10). There the
threshold level of disclosure computed to t = 8:0724. Using this value for the threshold, the
13 Note that this approach is not feasible for FOSD because a necessary condition for FOSD is that the
mean cash ow increases (i.e.,  increases). See, for example, the discussion on p. 338 of Hanoch and Levy
(1969).
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discount computes to  = 0:1493. Now suppose that in this illustration everything else is
held constant (ceteris paribus) except for the distribution of the rms cash ow, which is
now uniform over the interval [1; 19]. This represents a mean-preserving contraction of the
distribution. In this case the equilibrium threshold increases to t = 8:2692, consistent with
Proposition 2, while the discount decreases to  = 0:1315, consistent with Proposition 6.14
Proposition 6 has additional importance because its implications are consistent with prior
research that shows that improving the commitment to disclose will lead to a lower cost of
capital (e.g., Lambert, et al., 2007). That is, a MPC in F (V ) is tantamount to a decrease
in ex ante uncertainty about the rms cash ow. One potential source of decreased ex ante
uncertainty is an increase, or improvement in, disclosures by the rm prior to the rms
voluntary disclosure decision. In our model, Proposition 6 indicates that such improvements
will result in an unambiguous decrease in the discount in price. Thus there is nothing in
our model that is incompatible with prior research that establishes a negative association
between disclosure commitments and the cost of capital.
3.2 Additional analysis and discussion
Propositions 5 and 6 relate to changes in exogenous factors concerning investorsappetite
for risk (Proposition 5) or the riskiness of the rms cash ow (Proposition 6). In both cases,
changes that improve the adverse selection environment facing investors, and thus result in
decreased disclosure (Propositions 2 and 3), also result in a lower discount,. To gain further
insight into these results, recall that  is the di¤erence between the rms expected cash
ow, , and the expected price of its shares in period 1, P . One can express  equivalently
as the weighted average of the discount in price if the rm discloses its information, D, and
the discount in price if the rm withholds its information, ND:  = D + (1  )ND.
Because by construction in our model D = 0, this reduces to  = (1 )ND. That is, the
14 Although in general a MPC does not imply an unambiguous change in the probability of disclosure,
in this illustration the MPC reduces the probability of disclosure from 0.2982 to 0.2981. In other words,
consistent with a higher threshold level of disclosure, the likelihood of disclosure is lower.
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discount in price is the product of the probability that the rm withholds information and
the (conditional) discount manifest in price in this event. This indicates that the reduction
in  that occurs in Propositions 5 and 6 arises from a reduction in the conditional discount
in price in the event of non-disclosure. That is, improvements in the risk appetite of investors
and/or a decline in the riskiness of the rms cash ow cause the probability of non-disclosure
to increase, but at the same time cause the non-disclosure discount in price to decrease. In
Propositions 5 and 6 the second e¤ect dominates.
The impact on the non-disclosure discount in price itself reects two e¤ects. First, an
improvement in investorsappetite for risk and/or a decline in the riskiness of the rms
cash ow will reduce the discount in price absent any disclosure e¤ects. Second, the rise in
the disclosure threshold will reinforce this e¤ect indirectly. Specically, when the disclosure
threshold rises the conditional distribution of payo¤s perceived by investors is less skewed
to the right; the conditional distribution places less weight on values at the lower end of the
distribution.15 And because investors are risk averse, the decline in skewness is equivalent to
a decline in the perceived riskiness of the rm. This second, indirect, e¤ect also causes the
discount in price to be lower. Propositions 5 and 6 indicate that the combination of these
e¤ects on the discount in the event of non-disclosure outweighs the e¤ect on the likelihood
of disclosure.
In contrast, the e¤ect of a change in p has an ambiguous impact on . The reasons why
p is di¤erent are two fold. First, an increase in p increases the probability of non-disclosure
both directly and indirectly through the fact that the disclosure threshold rises. Recall
that the probability of non-disclosure is 1    = p + (1   p)F (t). Thus an increase in p
directly increases 1   , as well as indirectly increasing 1    through F (t). In contrast,
improvements in investorsappetite for risk and a decline in the riskiness of the rms cash
15 To see this, note that the conditional distribution of the rms payo¤ given non-disclosure is a weighted
mix of the unconditional distribution, F (), and the truncated lower range of F () (below the disclosure
threshold). Thus given non-disclosure investors perceive the distribution of the rms payo¤ as overweight-
inglow values relative to the unconditional distribution. With a higher disclosure threshold, the extent of
overweighting of low values is reduced.
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ow, as in Propositions 5 and 6, only increase 1    indirectly through F (t). As a result,
p has a greater impact on the probability of non-disclosure. At the same time, changes in
p do not a¤ect the underlying riskiness of the rms cash ow (as reected in F ()). This
reduces the impact of p on the discount in price if the rm withholds its information, ND.
Compared with Propositions 5 and 6, both of these e¤ects reduce the dominance of the
non-disclosure discount over the probability of non-disclosure in , and imply that there is
no monotonic association between p and  in general.
To illustrate this, consider again the illustration that followed Proposition 1 where we
assumed N = 10,  = 0:1,  = 0:9, and p = 0:5, and also assumed that ~V has a uniform
distribution between 0 and 20 (which implies  = 10). Figure 1 plots the discount, , against
p for two cases: N = 10 and N = 90. [Insert Figure 1 here.] Consistent with Proposition
5, the discount when N = 10 is greater than the discount when N = 90, for all values of p.
However, when N = 10 the discount monotonically increases with p whereas when N = 90
the discount rst increases and then decreases with p. In the former case, when the risk
bearing capacity of the economy is low, the e¤ect of the increase in p and the threshold on
the likelihood of non-disclosure is su¢ cient to outweigh the impact on the discount in the
non-disclosure price for all values of p. However when N = 90 and the markets risk-bearing
capacity is greater, when p is su¢ ciently high the latter e¤ect becomes more important; this
results in a non-monotonic association between disclosure and the average discount.
Finally, we note that Figure 1 suggests a potentially interesting implication for empirical
studies of voluntary disclosure and cost of capital. Figure 1 evidences a negative association
between disclosure and the discount in price when p is low. Because a low p corresponds to a
low 1  (probability of non-disclosure), this suggests that in a voluntary disclosure setting
one is more likely to observe the generally expected negative association between disclosure
and cost of capital when disclosure is high, rather than when disclosure is low.
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4 Summary
In this section we summarize our analysis of the association between voluntary disclosure
and the discount in price. To provide the reader with a quick reference to our summary, see
Table 2. [Insert Table 2 here.]
In our analysis we considered seven exogenous features of an economy: the switching
point in investorsutility for wealth, ; the slope in investorsutility for wealth, ; the prob-
ability that the rm has no knowledge of the cash ow realization in period 2, p; the number
of investors in the economy who compete for the rms shares, N ; and a change in the dis-
tribution of the rms cash ow in the sense of FOSD, SOSD, and a MPC (mean-preserving
contraction). We interpret an increase or improvement in each of these seven features as an
amelioration in the adverse selection environment between the rm and investors. For ex-
ample, an increase in the switching point and/or slope in investorsutility for wealth implies
that investors are less risk averse, which serves to ameliorate adverse selection. Similarly, an
improvement in the distribution of the rms cash ow in the sense of a MPC implies that
risk-averse investors perceive that the rms cash ow is less uncertain, which also serves to
ameliorate the adverse selection environment.
Propositions 2, 3, 5, and 6 have the following implications about the association between
measures of increased disclosure, as manifest in the threshold above which the rm discloses
(t) and the likelihood that the rm discloses (), and the extent to which investors discount
the rms expected cash ow, as measured by . Proposition 2 implies that as each of these
seven exogenous features of the economy increase or improve, the threshold level of disclosure
increases.16 Similarly, Proposition 3 implies that as four of these exogenous features increase
or improve, the probability of disclosure declines: only for changes in the distribution of the
rms cash ow is there no monotonic relation. Finally, Propositions 5 and 6 imply that as
four of these exogenous features increase or improve, the discount that investors apply to
16 Note that while Proposition 2 does not specically refer to a MPC, a MPC is a special case of SOSD
among distributions with equal means.
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the rms expected cash ow falls. Taken altogether, these results imply that an increase or
improvement in four exogenous features (, , N , and MPC) results in less disclosure, as
measured by either an increase in the threshold level of disclosure (t) and/or a decrease in of
the probability of disclosure (), and a lower discount. In other words, increased disclosure
and the discount are associated positively through , , N , and MPC.
The economic intuition that explains why increased voluntary disclosure and the dis-
count are associated positively in these circumstances is straightforward. A change in an
exogenous feature of the economy that results in investors applying a higher discount to the
rms expected cash ow will also motivate the rm to increase its disclosure to counteract
the higher discount. For example, investors who manifest greater risk aversion exacerbate
the adverse selection environment; this results, as a rst-order e¤ect, in an increase in the
discount. But as a consequence of heightened adverse selection, the rm, as a second-order
e¤ect, will increase disclosure. The problem is that the second-order e¤ect of more disclosure
will never dominate or reverse the rst-order e¤ect of a higher discount.
That said, we discuss a circumstance where the association between voluntary disclosure
and discount can be negative. Specically, we provide an example that shows that when
the number of investors who compete for a rms shares is low the discount investors apply
to price increases monotonically through p, whereas when the number is high the discount
eventually decreases with high p (see Figure 1). Because an increase in p increases the
threshold beyond which the rm discloses voluntarily and thus results in less disclosure,
this example might provide the motivation for an empirical experiment that conditions over
the number of investors and attempts to associate more voluntary disclosure with a lower
discount when the number is low, and more disclosure with a higher discount when the
number is high.
The fact that in a majority of circumstances measures of increased disclosure and the
discount are associated positively may have implications for an empirical research design
that investigates the contemporaneous association between voluntary disclosure and cost of
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capital. According to our results, such a design would encounter at best equivocal results,
and at worst a positive association due to variation across the sample in the exogenous
features we study that drive both disclosure choices and the discount investors apply to
rms expected cash ows.17 While empiricists are no doubt aware of this problem and
likely attempt to control for it in their studies, nonetheless it is a point worth emphasizing.
17 Empirical research that employs constructed disclosure indices (e.g., Botosan, 1997, amongst others)
embodies this approach because a disclosure index can be thought of as an aggregation across multiple
voluntary disclosure decisions made by the same rm.
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Table 1
~V the rms (uncertain) cash ow
p probability the rm is uninformed about its cash ow in period 1
P (V ) price of the rm conditional on disclosing V
P (ND) price of the rm conditional on no disclosure
P expected price of the rm in period 1
L; H lowest and highest values of ~V , respectively
 the rms expected cash ow
 the discount in price relative to 
 switching point in investorsutility for wealth
 slope in investorsutility for wealth when wealth exceeds 
N number of investors
q (V ) an investorsquote for holding the rms shares conditional on disclosing V
q (ND) an investorsquote for holding the rms shares conditional on no disclosure
t threshold level of disclosure
 probability of disclosure
Table of notation.
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Table 2 
Exogenous increase (improvement) 
in: 
Effect on the threshold 
level of disclosure, t 
Effect on the probability 
of disclosure, Π 
Effect on the discount in 
price, Δ 
 
Switching point in utility, α 
 
+ 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Slope in utility, β 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
- 
 
Number of investors, N 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
- 
 
Probability firm is uninformed, p 
 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
NMR 
 
MPC (mean preserving contraction) 
 
 
+ 
 
NMR 
 
- 
 
FOSD (1st-order stochastic dominance) 
 
 
+ 
 
NMR 
 
NA 
 
SOSD (2nd-order stochastic dominance) 
 
 
+ 
 
NMR 
 
NA 
NMR – Non-Monotonic Relation 
NA – Not Applicable 
 
The effect of an exogenous increase or improvement in various features of the economy on the threshold level of disclosure, t, the 
probability of disclosure, Π, and the discount in price, Δ, where “+” represents an increase, “-” represents a decrease, and NMR and 
NA are abbreviations for “Non-Monotonic Relation (in general)” and “Not Applicable,” respectively.   
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p 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
The effect of an increase in the probability that the firm is uninformed about its cash flow in 
period 1, p , on the discount in price, ∆  , based on the assumptions that 0.1α = , 0.9β = , and 
V  is distributed uniformly between 0 and 20. 
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
∆ 
∆(N=10) 
∆(N=90) 
Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. When T (t) is expressed as in eqn. (6), then
@
@
T (t) = p (1  )N (1  F (N+ t)) > 0. This implies that for all 0  ,
T (t) > T (t) j=0 = p

 (  t)  (1  )
Z t
L
F (V ) dV

  (1  p)
Z t
L
F (V ) dV;
and thus at t = L
T (t = L) > T (t = L) j=0 = p (  L) > 0:
Thus, T (t = L) > 0. When T (t) is expressed as in eqn. (5), T (t = H) reduces to
T (t = H) =  H < 0:
Thus, T (t = H) < 0. Finally, note that when T (t) is expressed as in eqn. (6),
@
@t
T (t) =   (p + p (1  )F (N+ t) + (1  p)F (t)) < 0;
which establishes that T (t) is monotonically decreasing in t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. When T (t) is expressed as in eqn. (6), consider rst @
@
t:
@
@
t =  
@
@
T (t)
@
@t
T (t)
=
p (1  )N (1  F (N+ t))
p + p (1  )F (N+ t) + (1  p)F (t) > 0:
When T (t) is expressed as in eqn. (5), consider @
@
t:
@
@
t =  
@
@
T (t)
@
@t
T (t)
=
p
R H
N+t
(V  N  t)dF (V )
p + p (1  )F (N+ t) + (1  p)F (t) > 0:
When T (t) is expressed as in eqn. (6), consider @
@p
T (t):
@
@p
T (t) =  (  t) + (1  )N  (1  )
Z N+t
L
F (V ) dV +
Z t
L
F (V ) dV:
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But the equilibrium condition as expressed in eqn. (6) implies
 (  t) + (1  )N  (1  )
Z N+t
L
F (V ) dV +
Z t
L
F (V ) dV =
1
p
Z t
L
F (V ) dV;
and thus
@
@p
t =  
@
@p
T (t)
@
@t
T (t)
=
1
p
R t
L
F (V ) dV
p + p (1  )F (N+ t) + (1  p)F (t)  0:
When T (t) is expressed as in eqn. (6), consider @
@N
t:
@
@N
t =  
@
@N
T (t)
@
@t
T (t)
=
p (1  )N (1  F (N+ t))
p + p (1  )F (N+ t) + (1  p)F (t) > 0:
Finally, with regard to FOSD and SOSD, when the equilibrium condition for the existence
of a threshold is expressed as in eqn. (6),
T (t) = p

 (  t) + (1  )N  (1  )
Z N+t
L
F (V ) dV

  (1  p)
Z t
L
F (V ) dV;
the proof of this result is su¢ ciently similar to the proof of Proposition 3 in JK such that
we refer the reader to that result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that  is dened as  = (1  p) (1  F (t)). The
derivative of  with respect to , , and N , has the opposite sign of the derivative of the
threshold, t, with respect to , , and N . For example, consider @
@
:
@
@
 =   (1  p) f (t) @
@
t < 0.
A similar relation is true for  and N . In addition, we know from Proposition 2 that the
derivative of the threshold with respect to , , and N is always positive: that is, @
@
t, @
@
t,
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@
@N
t are all positive. This proves (1), (2), and (4). In addition, consider @
@p
:
@
@p
 =   (1  F (t))  (1  p) f (t) @
@p
t < 0
because @
@p
t > 0. This proves (3). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. To sketch the derivation of eqn. (8), note that
P = E
h
P

~V

jDisclosure of ~V = V  t
i
 + P (ND) (1  )
=

1
1  F (t)
Z H
t
V dF (V )

 (1  p) (1  F (t)) + t (p+ (1  p)F (t))
= (1  p)
Z H
t
V dF (V ) + t (p+ (1  p)F (t))
=   p (  t) + (1  p)
Z t
L
(t  V ) dF (V ) ;
where the last equality follows from the fact that
R H
L
V dF (V ) = . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. When  is expressed as in eqn. (9), the derivative of the
discount with respect to , , and N , has the opposite sign of the derivative of the
threshold, t, with respect to , , and N . For example, consider @
@
:
@
@
 =  p @
@
t  (1  p)F (t) @
@
t =   (1  ) @
@
t:
In addition, we know from Proposition 2 that the derivative of the threshold with respect
to , , and N is always positive: that is, @
@
t, @
@
t, @
@N
t are all positive. This proves our
claim. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let F and G represent the discounts investors apply to the
rms expected cash ow when cash ow has a distribution F (V ) and G (V ), respectively,
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where G (V ) represents a MPC of F (V ). Re-express (10) as
 = p (1  )

 N  t 
Z N+t
L
F (V ) dF (V )

;
and then express F as
F = p (1  )

 N  tF +
Z N+tF
L
F (V ) dV

; (11)
and G
G = p (1  )

 N  tG +
Z N+tG
L
G (V ) dV

; (12)
where tF and tG represent the threshold levels of disclosure when cash ow has a
distribution F (V ) and G (V ), respectively. The di¤erence between F and G is
proportional (by a factor of p (1  )) to
F  G / tG   tF +
Z N+tF
L
F (V ) dV  
Z N+tG
L
G (V ) dV: (13)
From Proposition 2 we know that tG  tF because a MPC implies that G (V ) dominates
F (V ) in the sense of SOSD. Thus, dene  such that  = tG   tF  0. This allows us to
rewrite eqn. (13) as
F  G /  +
Z N+tF
L
(F (V ) G (V )) dV  
Z N+tF+
N+tF
G (V ) dV: (14)
Finally, note that if G (V ) is a MPC of F (V ), then G (V ) dominates F (V ) in the sense of
SOSD and thus
R x
 1 (F (V ) G (V )) dV  0 for all x. This implies that the
right-hand-side of eqn. (14) is greater than or equal to
  
Z N+tF+
N+tF
G (V ) dV:
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But if we dene K () such that K () =    R N+tF+
N+tF
G (V ) dV , then note that K (0) = 0
and @
@
K () = 1 G (N+ tF + )  0; thus, K ()  0 for all   0. Consequently, the
right-hand-side of eqn. (14) is greater than or equal to 0, and hence F  G. Q.E.D.
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